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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper examined the relationship between managerial share ownership and leverage of 35 non-
financial firms listed on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study covered the period 2005-
2014. Using panel data regression analysis and fixed effects model (with least squares as an estima-
tion technique), result revealed a positive and significant relationship between leverage and manageri-
al share ownership. This suggested that managerial share ownership, an important internal corporate 
governance mechanism, played an important role in a company’s capital structure decision. The out-
come of this study was supported by some prior empirical studies and provided evidence of alignment 
of the interests of management and shareholders as proposed by the Agency theory. It is recommend-
ed that Nigerian companies should encourage management to own shares in companies where they 
serve as directors as this will reduce managerial incentives to consume perquisites and expropriation 
of shareholders’ wealth or investing in unprofitable projects.   
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situations, the mode of financing does not 
matter in the determination of the value of 
the firm. They therefore suggested that a 
firm can as well be financed by 99.99% of 
debt capital as this will not affect the overall 
cost of capital and its value. Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) later faulted the above conclu-
sion when tax was taken into consideration. 
They realized that debt financing have tax 
advantage and concluded that firm should 
not take the tax advantage to the extreme 
because the value of the firm may be nega-
tively affected with high usage of debt capi-
tal. 
INTRODUCTION 
Background to the study 
Capital structure refers to the mix of debt 
and equity an organisation uses in financing 
its assets and operations. The decision con-
cerning capital structure is very critical to 
every business enterprise because it affects 
the stability as well as the ability of the firm 
to meet the requirements of its stakehold-
ers. The seminal work of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) opened the gate for the study 
of capital structure in the modern era. In 
their proposition, Modigliani and Miller 
concluded that under certain perfect market 
A comprehensive review of older empirical 
literature reveals attention of researchers to 
the study of the relationship between capital 
structure and firm performance or value. 
Recently, authors are now showing concern 
on how capital structure impacts on corpo-
rate governance mechanisms, as proposed 
in Agency theory of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). One of such governance mecha-
nisms that is not well explored is ownership 
structure. Ownership structure is discussed 
in many forms in the literature. This paper 
considers managerial share ownership as 
ownership structure proxy. 
 
There are several ways on how ownership 
of the firm may affect the capital structure. 
Reduction in scope of managerial oppor-
tunism (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986); internal 
control mechanism (Jensen, 1986); manage-
rial incentives reduction due to managerial 
share ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976); 
adverse effect on agency conflicts (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). However, results of prior 
empirical studies on the relationship be-
tween ownership and capital structure are 
mixed. 
 
Research objective 
The primary objective of this study is to 
investigate the relationship between mana-
gerial share ownership and capital structure 
decisions of listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
Justification for the study 
Paucity of research materials in this area of 
study especially in the developing countries, 
such as Nigeria, serves as a source of moti-
vation for the current study. It is expected 
that the outcome of this study will be a val-
uable contribution to the ever increasing 
empirical literature in Financial Manage-
ment / Accounting. Furthermore, academ-
ics, management of corporations, share-
holders, debt holders, regulatory agencies, 
professional managers and the general read-
ing public will find it useful in taking in-
formed decisions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical framework 
The outcomes of the studies of Modigliani 
and Miller (MM) (1958 and 1963) proposi-
tions led to several alternative capital struc-
ture theories. Of the theories that challenged 
the principles behind MM theorems, three of 
them need to be explained. First was the 
Static trade-off theory which presumes that a 
firm sets up a debt target ratio and moves 
towards its achievement. This target is set up 
as a trade-off between the costs and the ben-
efits of debt, that is, bankruptcy costs against 
tax benefits. Empirically, the theory posited a 
positive relationship between profitability 
and level of debt usage. Studies conducted 
by Flamnery and Rangan (2004), Salawu and 
Agboola (2008), Abdeljawad, Mat-Nor, Ibra-
him and Abdul-Rahim (2013) and Haron 
(2014) have confirmed this theory empirical-
ly. 
 
Secondly, the pecking order theory of Myers 
(1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) submit-
ted that due to asymmetry information, a 
firm will prefer the use of internal source 
(retained earnings) to external source when 
faced with financing decision. When external 
source is required, a firm will prefer debt 
capital (a cheaper source) to equity capital. 
Empirically, the theory suggested a negative 
relationship between profitability and debt. 
Among authors that have tested and con-
firmed the prediction of this theory are Abor 
and Biekpe (2005), Chen and Zhao (2005), 
Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2006), Abor 
(2008), Kajola, Okewale and Desu (2008), 
Abdeljawad, et al (2013), Haron (2014), Fa-
thi, Ghandehari and Shirangi (2014), Wahab 
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and Ramli (2014), Masood (2014), Alani and 
Alamri (2015), Acaravci (2015) and Kajola 
(2015). 
 
Thirdly, Agency theory propounded by Jen-
sen and Meckling (1976) argued that man-
agers as agent of shareholders, the principal, 
have tendency to involve in some activities 
which profit them as managers but which 
are against the interest of their principal. 
This results in agency conflict. To compel 
managers to do things according to the 
wishes of the shareholders will involve seri-
ous monitoring. The cost attached to this 
monitoring is known as agency cost. The 
higher the need to monitor the managers, 
the higher the agency costs will be.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that 
managerial shareholding can be used to re-
duce managerial incentives to consume per-
quisites and expropriate shareholders’ 
wealth and results in alignment of the inter-
est of management and shareholders. Alt-
hough, this was challenged by Fama and 
Jensen (1983) who argued that managerial 
shareholding can have adverse effects on 
agency conflict through entrenchment of 
present managers leading to increase in 
managerial opportunism. Pinegar and Wil-
bricht (1989) cited in Boodhoo (2009), ar-
gued that principal-agent problem can be 
dealt with to some extent through the capi-
tal structure by increasing the debt level and 
without causing any radical increase in agen-
cy costs.    
 
Related empirical studies 
In the literature different variables have 
been discussed and used to measure owner-
ship. Some of these are ownership concen-
tration, managerial ownership, domestic 
ownership, foreign ownership and institu-
tional ownership. The relationship between 
each of these ownership proxies and leverage 
has produced mixed empirical results. Some 
of these studies are reported here.  
 
Wen (2002) used data from listed companies 
in China, provided evidence of negative and 
significant relationship between gearing 
(leverage) level and representation of non-
executive directors on the board (ownership 
structure proxy). This finding was contrary 
to the outcome of Pfeffer and Salancick 
(1978) who reported a positive relationship 
between the two variables in their study.   
 
Joher, Ali and Nazul (2006) assessed the rela-
tionship between ownership structure 
(managerial ownership) and debt policy of 
firms listed on Kuala Lumpur Stock Ex-
change. Result showed a negative association 
between leverage and managerial ownership. 
Similar result was also found in a study con-
ducted by Nyonna (2012).   
 
Arshad and Safdar (2009) explored the rela-
tionship between corporate governance and 
capital structure of 58 listed companies in 
Pakistan for the period 2002 to 2005. Results 
revealed that board size and managerial 
shareholding was significantly and negatively 
correlated with debt to equity ratio. The re-
sults suggested that corporate governance 
variables like size and ownership structure 
and managerial shareholding played signifi-
cant role in determination of financial mix of 
the selected firms.  
 
Cheng and Tzeng (2011) investigated the 
effect of ownership structure (surrogated by 
ownership concentration and family owner-
ship) on leverage and performance in the 
electronics, textile and chemical industries in 
Taiwan from 2000-2009. The empirical re-
sults showed that ownership concentration 
was positively related to leverage and firm 
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performance for the electronics and textile 
industries; the positive effects of ownership 
concentration on leverage tend to be weak-
er when moderated by firm performance; 
and various ownership structures reflected 
different levels of managerial opportunism 
across different industries. 
 
Sivathaasan  (2013) studied the impact of 
ownership structure (foreign and domestic 
ownerships) on capital structure decision 
among quoted manufacturing firms in Sri 
Lanka during 2009-2011. Results revealed a 
positive relationship between foreign own-
ership and leverage, whereas leverage was 
negatively correlated with domestic owner-
ship.  
 
Javeed, Hassan and Azeem (2014) investi-
gated the impact of capital structure on cor-
porate governance measures (board inde-
pendence, ownership concentration, mana-
gerial ownership, board independence and 
chief executive officer duality) of 155 non-
financial companies listed on Karachi Stock 
Exchange, Pakistan for financial years, 2008
-2012. The study revealed insignificant im-
pact of leverage on corporate governance 
measures. 
 
Ukaegbu, Oino and Dada (2014) examined 
the relationship between corporate govern-
ance and capital structure using panel data 
of selected Nigerian large non-financial 
firms for 2008-2012. Results indicated sig-
nificant relationship between ownership 
variables and leverage; positive with board 
composition and negative with board meet-
ing. 
 
Arsian and Zaman (2014) explored the im-
pact of ownership structure (institutional 
ownership and ownership concentration) 
on capital structure in textile sector and rest 
of the manufacturing sectors (non-textile) in 
Pakistan for 2006-2009. The results suggest-
ed that in textile sector no significant rela-
tionship exists between ownership concen-
tration and capital structure whereas a signif-
icant negative relationship was found be-
tween these two variables in case of non-
textile firms. Furthermore, institutional own-
ership variable was found to be non-
significant in both textile and non-textile sec-
tors. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data source 
Data for this study were sourced from the 
audited reports and accounts of the sampled 
companies and from the Nigerian Stock Ex-
change Fact Books for 2005-2014. The 
choice of the study period was guided by 
availability of data.  
 
Population, sample and sampling tech-
nique 
183 non- financial firms were listed on the 
floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 
the beginning of 2005 and this constituted 
the population of the study. The sample size 
of 35 companies was chosen from the popu-
lation through the combination of judgmen-
tal and stratified sampling techniques. In all, 
the 35 companies covered 15 business sec-
tors (see Appendix 1).   
 
 
Research instrument 
Panel data regression analysis was adopted. 
This involved simultaneous combination of 
cross-sectional and time series data. Three 
different estimation techniques were initially 
considered. These are simple pooled Ordi-
nary Least Squares (OLS); Fixed effects; and 
Random effects. Since companies of differ-
ent sizes and sectors comprised the sample, 
the use of simple pooled OLS may not give 
correct inferences on the relationship be-
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tween the study variables. Hence, in line 
with Marfo-Yiadom and Agyei (2011) and 
Dawood et al (2011), Least Squares with 
Fixed effects model and Random effects 
model (with Generalized Least Squares, 
GLS as estimation technique) where lagged 
values are not included among the regres-
sors was applied. This helped to alleviate 
the endogeneity problem that may occur 
due to omitted variables, measurement er-
ror of explanatory variables or reverse cau-
sality between the dependent variable and 
the explanatory variables. In order to deter-
mine which of the other two (Fixed or Ran-
dom effects) techniques to be used for valid 
inferences, Hausman’s specification test was 
conducted.  
 
Description of variables 
Dependent Variable 
Leverage: This is the only dependent varia-
ble of the study and it is measured by the 
ratio of total debts to total asset. Although, 
there is no universally acceptable proxy for 
leverage (as some researchers prefer book 
values to market values and vice versa) in 
the literature, the study adopted the use of 
book values in line with the submission of 
Rajan and Zingales (1995).   
 
Independent variable 
Ownership structure is the only independ-
ent variable of the study. The current study 
adopted managerial share ownership, which 
is measured as the proportion of shares 
owned by management (directors or insid-
ers) to the total equity shares in issue by the 
company, as ownership structure proxy. 
Using managerial share ownership as own-
ership structure proxy is unique because 
directors who own shares in an organisation 
belong to both management and equity 
shareholders (owners) and resolving conflict 
between management and owners is the 
main issue in Agency theory. The direction 
of the relationship between leverage and 
ownership structure depends on the theory 
behind it. The Alignment of interest hypoth-
esis proposes a positive relationship while 
the Entrenchment hypothesis predicts a neg-
ative relationship.   
 
Control variables 
Profitability: There exist in the literature suf-
ficient evidence that show the importance of 
profitability as a variable that can influence 
both leverage and ownership structure. That 
explains the reason for the use of profitabil-
ity as a control variable in the study. The di-
rection of the relationship between profita-
bility and leverage however, depends on the 
capital structure theory. The pecking order 
theory predicts a negative relationship be-
tween leverage and profitability. Static trade-
off predicts a positive signal because the 
higher the firm’s profitability, the higher the 
potential tax shields and therefore the higher 
the debt level. Profitability in this study is 
defined as the ratio of profit after tax to total 
assets. 
 
 
Firm Size: This is defined as natural log of 
total assets. Bevan and Danbolt (2002), in 
support of the Static trade- off theory, ar-
gued that large firms tend to hold more debt 
because they are regarded as being “too big 
to fail” and therefore receive better access to 
the capital market. Abor (2008) posited that 
lenders to larger firms are more likely to get 
repaid than lenders to smaller firms, reducing 
the agency cost associated with debt. There-
fore, larger firms will have higher debts. Stat-
ic Trade Off theory expects a positive signal 
from this variable. On the other hand, the 
Pecking order theory argues that larger firms 
are able to support their investment from 
internal source, hence the use of lesser 
amount of debts. A negative relationship is 
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predicted between the two variables by the 
theory.   
 
Tangibility: This is defined as the ratio of 
firm’s non-current asset (fixed asset) to total 
asset. Asset tangibility is considered as a 
proxy for collaterals. Wedig, Sloan, Asan 
and Morrisey (1988) submitted that debt 
may be more readily used if there are dura-
ble assets to serve as collateral. Therefore, 
the more tangible assets a firm possess, the 
more the expectation for higher leverage. 
This assertion is supported by the Static 
trade- off theory. Pecking order theory con-
siders the relationship between asset tangi-
bility and leverage from another stand 
point. The theory argues that firms with 
higher tangible assets generally have less 
information asymmetry and they are able to 
sell their equity shares at fair prices. The 
result is that such firms use lesser amount 
of debt capital; hence a negative relation-
ship is expected between the two variables.  
 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of the study in its null form 
is as stated below: 
Ho: There is no significant relationship between 
managerial share ownership and capital structure 
decision of Nigerian listed firms. 
 
Model specification 
The model specification of the study is in 
line with what obtains in the extant empiri-
cal literature, with a little modification. This 
is as presented in 3.1. 
Lit=β0+β1OWNit+β2PROFit+β3SIZEit 
+β4TANGit+eit                                                                    
(3.1) 
Where, 
 
Lit           =  Leverage 
OWN       =  Managerial share ownership 
PROF       =  Profitability 
SIZE        =  Firm size 
TANG      = Asset tangibility 
β0       =   Intercept of the equation 
β1, β2,   β3, β4 =  coefficients of the independ-
ent and control variables 
eit = error term 
Validity and reliability of research instru-
ment  
Data used for the study were obtained from 
reliable sources. The companies’ annual ac-
counts and reports were audited by reputable 
firms of accountants and were scrutinized by 
relevant regulatory agencies- Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE) and Financial Re-
porting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) and ap-
proved for public use. Furthermore, the re-
search instrument used for the study has 
been used and empirically found to be suita-
ble by researchers in both developed and 
emerging countries.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in the study. 
S. O. KAJOLA., K. H. APELOGUN AND O. O. OWORU  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
  Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
LEV 0.206 0.000 3.091 0.275 5.019 42.575 
OWN 0.109 0.000 0.761 0.190 1.960 2.729 
PROF 0.049 -3.026 0.508 0.192 -12.066 189.538 
SIZ 9.816 8.020 11.499 0.768 -0.346 -0.662 
TANG 0.374 0.049 0.823 0.182 0.562 -0.333 
Source: Authors’ computation with the use of E- Views 7.0 (2016) 
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The average debt to total asset used by the 
sampled firms during the period of study, as 
shown in Table 1,is 0.206. It clearly shows 
that majority of the firms are low geared, 
although one of the firms used more than 
three times the size of total asset (maximum 
value of 3.091). The Table 1 further shows 
that the average managerial ownership of 
0.109. This indicates that, on the average, 
managers’ ownership (represented by direc-
tors’ holding), was about 11%, while other 
shareholders owned about 89%. The aver-
age profitability of the firms is about 5% 
and the proportion of fixed (non-current) 
asset to total asset is about 37.4%.     
 
Collinearity test 
Three methods were used to test the multi-
collinearity between the explanatory models 
used in the study. These are correlation ma-
trix; Vector Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tol-
erance Value (TV). Gujarati (2003) and 
Rumsey (2007) suggested that correlation 
coefficient value of 0.8 and above for an in-
dependent variable indicated existence of 
high multicollinearity problem between it 
and other variables. Furthermore, Gujarati 
(2003) posited that a variable with VIF of 
above 10 or Tolerance value of less than 0.1 
showed existence of high multicollinearity 
between it and other variables.   
 
As seen in Table 3, no variable has a coeffi-
cient value of 0.8 and above. Also in Table 2, 
no variable has VIF of above 10 or TV of 
less than 0.1. These results confirmed that 
there was no high multicollinearity between 
explanatory variables used in the study. 
Hence, valid inferences would be made in 
regression analysis conducted.     
MANAGERIAL SHARE OWNERSHIP AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE...  
Table 2 shows the result of collinearity test conducted using the VIF and TV methods. 
Variable VIF Tolerance value 
OWN 1.230 0.813 
PROF 1.015 0.985 
SIZ 1.255 0.797 
TANG 1.037 0.964 
Source: Authors’ computation with the use of E- Views 7.0 (2016) 
Correlation 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables. 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
  LEV OWN PROF SIZ TANG   
LEV 1.000 
  
          
OWN 0.065 
(0.227) 
1.000 
  
        
PROF -0.520* 
(0.000) 
-0.072 
(0.181) 
1.000 
  
      
SIZ 0.108* 
(0.044) 
-0.427* 
(0.000) 
0.069 
(0.200) 
1.000 
  
    
TANG 0.023 
(0.675) 
-0.094 
(0.081) 
-0.077 
(0.153) 
0.165* 
(0.002) 
1.000 
  
  
       
* indicates significant at 5% level          
Sig-values are shown in parentheses 
Source: Authors’ computation with the use of E- Views 7.0 (2016) 
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Table 3 presents a positive but insignificant 
association between leverage and manageri-
al ownership. It also shows a negative and 
significant association between leverage and 
profitability at 5% level; positive association 
between leverage and firm size and insignif-
icant association with asset tangibility. 
Since, correlation matrix only shows direc-
tion of relationship or association (not 
strength of relationship) between two varia-
bles, it cannot be used to make valid infer-
ences, hence the reason for the conduct of 
regression analysis.  
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Regression 
Table 4(a) exhibits the regression analysis for the simple pooled OLS. 
Table 4: Regression results- Simple pooled OLS 
Variable coefficient t-stat prob 
Constant -0.432 -2.391* 0.017 
OWN 0.153 2.118* 0.035 
PROF -0.757 -11.654* 0.000 
SIZE 0.069 3.816* 0.000 
TANG -0.060 -0.869 0.385 
R2 0.301     
Adj R2 0.293     
F-stat 37.091*     
Durbin-Watson 1.179     
Observations 350     
Dependent variable: Leverage 
*,  indicates significant at 5% level 
Source: Authors’ computation with the use of E- Views 7.0 (2016) 
In Table 4 the relationship between leverage 
(capital structure proxy) and managerial 
share ownership (ownership proxy) is posi-
tive and significant at 5%. For the control 
variables, it reveals a negative and signifi-
cant relationship between leverage and 
profitability at 5% and positive and signifi-
cant relationship between leverage and firm 
size at 5% level. A negative but insignificant 
relationship is also shown between leverage 
and asset tangibility. However, as a result of 
the limitation in using simple pooled OLS 
as estimation technique, the study then con-
ducted another set of regression analysis 
using both the Fixed effects and Random 
effects models. The F-stat value of 37.091 
which is significant at 1% level indicates that, 
as a whole the model is fit. Durbin-Watson 
value of 1.179 (which is between 1 and 3, 
according to Wooldridge, 2002 and Alseed, 
2005) indicates little or no presence of auto-
correlation.   
 
Discussion of findings 
In order to determine which of the estima-
tions of the two models (Fixed and Random 
effects) is to be used for the purpose of mak-
ing conclusions, Hausman specification test 
was conducted. The null hypothesis underly-
ing the Hausman specification test is that 
fixed and random effects models’ estimates 
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do not differ substantially. Empirically, if 
the prob value of the Chi-square is greater 
(lesser) than 0.05, the estimations based on 
the Random effects (Fixed effects) will be 
better off. 
Results of Hausman specification test are 
reported in Table 5. It shows that the prob 
value of the test is 0.000, which is less than 
0.05. Null hypothesis is rejected and this 
lead to the use of Fixed effects model for 
making valid inferences. 
Table 4(b) also presented the regression 
analysis for the Fixed effects and Random 
effects models. Although, there is no signif-
icant difference between the results of the 
two models, but based on the outcome of 
the Hausman specification test, inference 
was made using the outcome of the Fixed 
effects model alone. 
The F-stat value of 13.285 indicates that as 
a whole, the model is fit. The Durbin-
Watson statistic value of 1.343 indicates no 
presence of serial autocorrelation. 
There is a positive and significant relation-
ship between leverage and managerial share 
ownership at 1% level. It suggests that the 
higher the equity ownership by manage-
ment (directors) of corporation, the higher 
will be the level of gearing of the firm. This 
supports the view that ownership influences 
capital decisions of firms. This outcome has 
the support of Lubatkin and Chatterjee 
(1994), who argued that increasing the debt 
to equity ratio will help firms ensure that 
managers are running the business efficient-
ly. Hence, managers will return excess cash 
flow to the shareholders rather than invest-
ing in negative NPV projects since the man-
agers will have to make sure that the debt 
obligations of the firms are repaid. Thus, 
managers that are not able to meet the debt 
obligations can be replaced by more effi-
cient managers who can better serve the 
interests of shareholders. The implication of 
this is that high geared firms are better for 
both shareholders and debt holders as debt 
level can be used for monitoring the manag-
ers. Empirical supports for the positive rela-
tionship between the two variables also 
come from the studies conducted by Pfefzer 
and Salancick (1978), Kim and Sorenson 
(1986), Mehran et al (1992), Short, Keasey 
and Duxbury (2002) and Driffield, Maham-
bare, and Pal (2006, 2007), Gul, Sajid, Raz-
zaq and Afzal (2012), Agyei and Owusu 
(2014) and Seyed, Hassan and Mohsen 
(2015). Theoretically, the outcome of the 
study is in agreement with the alignment of 
interest hypothesis of Agency theory.  
The null hypothesis is rejected in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis. Thus, there is a 
significant relationship between managerial 
share ownership and capital structure deci-
sion of Nigerian listed firms. 
 
As for the control variables, Table 5 reveals a 
negative and significant relationship between 
leverage and profitability. This is in accord-
ance with the Pecking order theory. Empiri-
cally, the outcome is in agreement with the 
studies of Abdeljawad, et al (2013), Haron 
(2014), Fathi, Ghandehari and Shirangi 
(2014), Kajola, Abosede and Akindele 
(2014), Arslan and Zaman (2014), Ukaegbu, 
et al (2014), Wahab and Ramli (2014), Alani 
and Alamri (2015), Onaolapo, Kajola and 
Nwidobie (2015), Mohammad, Mir, and Ho-
jjatollah, (2015) and Acaravci (2015).  
 
The relationship between firm size and lever-
age is positive and significant at 5% level. 
This is in line with the prediction of Static 
trade-off theory. The empirical studies of 
Arshad and Safdar (2009), Bae (2009), Cheng 
and Tzeng (2011), Akinlo (2011), Ezeoha 
(2011), Levent and Ersan (2012), Kumar, 
Dhanasekaran, Sandhya and Saravanan 
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(2012), Mahvish and Qaisar (2012), Maxwell 
and Kehinde (2012), Tomak (2013), Wahab 
and Ramli (2014), Abdeljawad et al (2014) 
and Kajola (2015) supported a positive rela-
tionship between the two variables.  
Table 5 further reveals a negative but insig-
nificant relationship between leverage and 
asset tangibility. This is against the predic-
tions of both the Static trade-off and Agency 
theories, which predicted positive and nega-
tive relationship, respectively. The finding is 
consistent with studies conducted by Al-
Fayoumi and Abuzayed (2009) and Arslan 
and Zaman (2014).  
S. O. KAJOLA., K. H. APELOGUN AND O. O. OWORU  
Table 5: Regression results- Fixed effects and Random effects 
  Fixed effects       Random effects   
Variable coefficient t-stat prob coefficient t-stat prob 
Constant -2.488 -3.535* 0.001 -0.506 -2.038* 0.042 
OWN 0.398 2.711* 0.007 0.242 2.483* 0.014 
PROF -0.482 -8.615* 0.000 -0.539 -10.029* 0.000 
SIZE 0.275 3.855* 0.000 0.076 3.021* 0.003 
TANG -0.072 -0.682 0.496 -0.086 -1.009 0.314 
R2 0.675     0.222     
Adj R2 0.624     0.213     
F-stat 
prob 
13.285* 
(0.000) 
    24.570* 
(0.000) 
    
Durbin-
Watson 
1.343     1.083     
Hausman’s 
Test (Chi-sq) 
Prob 
      
30.138 
(0.000) 
  
  
    
Observations 350     350     
Dependent variable: Leverage 
* indicates significant at  5% level 
Source: Authors’ computation with the use of E- Views 7.0 (2016) 
CONCLUSION,  
RECOMMENDATION AND 
FUTURE STUDY 
Conclusion 
The objective of the study was to examine 
the relationship between ownership struc-
ture and capital structure decision of 35 non
-financial firms listed on Nigerian Stock 
Exchange for the period 2005-2014. This 
represented 350 firm-year observations. 
Managerial share ownership, an important 
internal control corporate governance mech-
anism, was used to proxy for ownership 
structure while leverage served as surrogate 
for capital structure decision. 
Managerial share ownership as a proxy for 
ownership structure is interesting and its re-
lationship with leverage is not well re-
searched in both developed and developing 
economies. This is because managers 
(represented by directors) occupy a distinct 
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position in an organisation. They are the 
agents of shareholders on one hand and on 
the other hand, part-owners of the business, 
due to their equity holdings.   
 
The study employed Fixed effects model, 
with least squares, to estimate the coeffi-
cients of the explanatory (ownership struc-
ture) and control variables (profitability, 
firm size and asset tangibility). 
The result revealed a strong positive and 
significant relationship between ownership 
structure and capital structure decision. It 
further suggested that debt is an efficient 
mechanism which is used to monitor man-
agers with the aim of minimizing managerial 
opportunism or moral hazard problems. 
The result provided evidence in support of 
alignment of interest hypothesis.     
 
 
Recommendation 
Following the outcome of the study, it is 
recommended that Nigerian corporations 
should encourage managers to buy and own 
shares in companies where they serve as 
directors. This will enable them to judi-
ciously utilize debt capital in such projects 
that will improve the performance of the 
business. Excess cash flow will not be used 
to finance unprofitable projects because if 
that is done and they find it difficult to ser-
vice the obligations of debt holders, they 
can be replaced by some other people.  
 
Suggestion for future study 
 In order to increase the accuracy of the 
regression model, efforts in the future 
should be directed to the study of the ef-
fects of other corporate governance mecha-
nisms such as ownership concentration, 
family ownership, foreign/ domestic own-
ership and institutional ownership on capi-
tal structure decisions. There is also the 
need to increase the study period to at least 
twenty years, as well as the number of sam-
ple firms. 
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